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𝑿          Horizontal position at the seabed (𝑚)  
𝛿          Lateral deviation (𝑚) 
𝑝(𝑋)       Probability of a dropped object landing at position X 
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𝒀          Horizontal position along Y direction (𝑚) 
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𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡        Frequency of drop per lift (per year) 
𝑚𝑝         Plastic moment capacity of the wall (=
1
4
𝜎𝑦𝑡
2) (𝑁) 
𝛿1          Pipe deformation (or dent depth) (𝑚) 
𝑡           Wall thickness (𝑚) 
𝜎𝑦          Yield stress (𝑁/𝑚
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𝐶𝐷          Drag coefficient 
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𝐵           Width of the dropped object (𝑚) 
𝑥0           Penetration depth (𝑚) 
ℎ            Height of dropped objects (𝑚) 
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Abstract  
Nowadays, as oil industry gradually moves towards deep sea fields with water depth more than 1000 
meters, they are subjected to several threats which can cause failure of the pipeline, of which the 
accidentally-dropped objects have become the leading external risk factor for subsea developments. In 
this thesis, a sample field layout introduced in Det Norske Veritas (DNV) guide rules is selected as the 
study case with 100m water depth. Six different groups of dropped objects are used in this paper. The 
conditional hit probability for long/flat shaped objects will be calculated with the methods from both 
DNV rules and an in-house tool Dropped Objects Simulator (DROBS). The difference between the 
results will be discussed. Meanwhile, the sensitivity analysis on mass (M), collision area (A), the 
volume (V), added mass coefficient (Ca) and drag coefficient (Cd) of the objects are calculated. 
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I. Introduction 
    Subsea pipelines are one of the most economic and reliable means of transporting hydrocarbons. 
However, in remote areas, they may be susceptible to leakage and rupture due to unavoidable factors 
(Y. Yang et al. 2016). Not to mention that the leakage of oil will have a great influence on the ocean 
environment and cause significant repair costs. One of the simplest ways to estimate the failure 
frequency is to look at statistically incident records as shown in Fig. 1, from which third-party damage 
and corrosion constitute are the most important risk factors, accounting for 38% and 36% respectively. 
As the impact of dropped objects can be viewed as a genre accounting for the third-party damage, 
accidentally dropped objects from a platform deck or from a supply vessel or during a hoisting operation 
may cause fatal casualties. Therefore, to protect the subsea system, it is necessary to estimate the hit 
probability of the accidentally-dropped objects on the seabed as well as the sensitivity analysis of some 
important parameters. 
Figure 1 Cause distribution of subsea pipeline failure (Yang et al 2016) 
In recent years, several analysis methods have been proposed on offshore risk assessment. Begg 
et al. (1992) described an analysis methodology in which cumulative impact frequencies over a subsea 
grid element give impact scatter diagrams, impact contour maps and three-dimensional (3D) impact 
probability density functions. Luo et al. (1992) focused on the transient motion of dropped objects 
during offshore operations and their potential cause of damage to underwater installations. The motion 
differential equations in the time domain was presented to predict the falling motion and some key 
parameters which have significant influence on the object motion were also carried out. Alessandro 
(2000) utilized a probabilistic methodology to estimate the pipeline impact and rupture frequencies 
related to dropped objects, thus may give useful information about the highest impact frequency 
location as well as the rupture frequency upstream and downstream of the valve. Yang et al. (2009) 
carried out experiments and numerical simulations, finding that the initial impact position influenced 
the impact results. Stefani et al. (2009) developed a new model to estimate the annual failure frequency 
 
2 
 
based on design and operating conditions and predict the level of risk to both human being and the 
environment. Stefani and Carr (2010) used Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to predict the level of 
risk to see if there is a common trend regarding failure rates and failure-rate dependence on pipeline 
parameters. Xiang et al. (2016) considered a new three-dimensional (3D) theory which considers the 
effect of axial rotation on dropped cylindrical objects. Based on this 3D theory, a numerical tool called 
Dropped Objects Simulator (DROBS) had been developed to determine the risk-free zones for offshore 
lifting operations. Bin et al. (2016) used finite element analysis to analyze the impact damage of deck 
construction, equipment and subsea pipelines, obtain empirical formula through these data and finally 
construct failure function in Monte Carlo calculation to simplify the collision calculation. At the same 
time, in models involving many input variables, sensitivity analysis is an essential ingredient of model 
building and quality assurance. National and international agencies involved in impact 
assessment studies have included sections devoted to sensitivity analysis in their guidelines. Examples 
are the European Commission (see e.g. the guidelines for impact assessment) the White House Office 
of Management and Budget, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and US Environmental 
Protection Agency's modelling guidelines.  
The proposed methodology of submarine pipeline failure probability assessment is shown in the 
flowchart below. 
Figure 2 Proposed methodology of submarine pipeline failure probability assessment 
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In this paper, an example of a “detailed risk assessment of dropped objects on a 20-inch pipeline 
at seabed”, as described in DNV recommended practice rule is selected as the study case. Three different 
groups of flat/long shaped dropped objects (Case 1 ~ 3) and three different groups of box/round shaped 
dropped objects (Case 4 ~ 6) are used in the model with weights less than 2 tones (Case 1, Case 4), 
between 2 tones and 8 tones (Case 2, Case 5) and greater than 8 tones (Case 3, Case 6). The DNV 
simplified method is used to calculate the hit probability as well as the probability of failure in relation 
to impact frequency. The conditional hit probability for long/flat shaped objects will also be calculated 
with the method of an in-house tool Dropped Objects Simulator (DROBS). The difference between the 
results of DNV rules and DROBS are also compared to see the pattern. Meanwhile, the sensitivity 
analysis convergent by Monte Carlo Simulation is also applied through MATLAB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
II. Theories 
2.1 Risk Assessment Procedures in DNV’s Recommended Practice 
    Since the excursion of different objects is a stochastic event, DNV’s simplified method assumes 
the landing point on the horizontal position of seabed to be normally distributed: 
                           𝑝(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝛿
𝑒
−
1
2
(
𝑋
𝛿
)
2
                               (1) 
where, 𝑋 is the horizontal position at the seabed (in ‘meter’); 𝛿 is the lateral deviation (in ‘meter’) 
and 𝑝(𝑋) is the probability of a dropped object landing at position X.  
    The lateral deviation 𝛿 can be calculated based on the following formula: 
                              𝛿 = 𝑑 ∙ tan 𝛼                                  (2) 
where, d is water depth. 
    The probability that a dropped object will land at the seabed within a certain distance R from the 
vertical line through the drop point is then expressed by the cumulative distribution function: 
                           𝑃(𝑟 ≤ 𝑅) = ∫ 𝑝(𝑟)𝑑𝑟
𝑅
0
                             (3) 
where, r is the absolute excursion on the seabed (in ‘meter’) and defined as√𝑋2 + 𝑌2 ; 𝑌 is the 
horizontal position along Y direction (in ‘meter’); 𝑝(𝑟) is the probability of a dropped object landing 
at excursion r.  
    In DNV’s guided practice, dropped objects can be classified into six types, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Object classification from DNV’s guided practice 
Description Weight (tons) Typical objects Angular deviation 𝛼 (°) 
Flat/long 
shaped 
< 2 Drill collar/casing, scaffolding 15 
2 – 8 Drill collar/casing 9 
> 8 Drill riser, crane boom 5 
Box/round 
shaped 
< 2 Container (food, space parts), basket, crane block 10 
2 – 8 Container (space parts), basket, crane test block 5 
> 8 Container (equipment), basket 3 
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    The actual extent of the vulnerable items on the seabed within each ring can easily be incorporated 
by dividing the probability into several rings, as indicated in Fig. 3.  
Figure 3 Probability of hit within a ring with inner radius 𝑟𝑖 and outer radius 𝑟𝑜 (DNV, 2010) 
The probability of hit 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟 within a ring area  𝐴𝑟 with an inner radius 𝑟𝑖 and an outer radius 
𝑟𝑜 can be found by: 
               𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟 = 𝑃(𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝑜) = 𝑃(𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝑜) − 𝑃(𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝑖)                 (4)  
    The ring area 𝐴𝑟 can be easily calculated by 
                              𝐴𝑟 =  𝜋(𝑟𝑜
2 − 𝑟𝑖
2)                              (5) 
    The conditional probability of hit per seabed area, 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝐴𝑟, is defined by dividing the hit probability 
𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟 by the area of circle with radius 𝑟:   
                             𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑟,𝑟 =
𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟
 𝐴𝑟
                                (6) 
Within a certain ring, the probability of hit to a pipeline or umbilical with an object, 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r, can 
be described as the exposed area which gives a hit within a ring divided on the total area of the ring, 
multiplied with the probability of hit within the ring, see Equation (7): 
                        𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r = 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟 ∙
𝐿𝑠𝑙∙(𝐷+𝐵)
𝐴𝑟
                           (7) 
where, 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r = Probability of hit on subsea line (sl) within a certain ring, r 
       𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑟 = Probability of hit within the ring, see Equation (4) 
       𝐿𝑠𝑙 = length of subsea line within the ring (m) 
       𝐷 = Diameter of subsea line (m), see Fig. 3 
       B = Breadth of falling object (m), see Fig. 3 
       𝐴𝑟= Area within the ring (𝑚
2), see Fig. 3 
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    The frequency of hit can be estimated based on the number of lifts, the drop frequency per lift and 
the probability of hit to the exposed sections of the subsea lines. For a certain ring around the drop point, 
the hit frequency is estimated by the following: 
                      𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r = 𝑁𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r                         (8) 
where, 𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r = frequency of hit to the subsea line within a certain ring (per year) 
       𝑁𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡 = number of lifts (per year), see table 3 
       𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡 = frequency of drop per lift (per year), see table 2, and we use 1.2e-5 here 
       𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡,sl,r = probability of hit to a subsea line within a certain ring, see Equation (7)  
Table 2 Frequencies for dropped objects into the sea 
Type of lift Frequency of dropped object into the sea (per lift) 
Ordinary lift to/from supply vessel with 
platform crane < 20 tones 
1.2 × 10-5 
Heavy lift to/from supply vessel with the 
platform crane > 20 tones 
1.6 × 10-5 
Handling of load < 100 tones with the 
lifting system in the drilling derrick 
2.2 × 10-5 
Handling of BOP/load > 100 tones with 
the lifting system in the drilling derrick 
1.5 × 10-3 
Table 3 Object classification of annual crane load data lifted 
No Description Weight [tones] Number lifted per year, 𝑁𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡 
1 
Flat/long shaped 
< 2 700 
2 2 – 8 50 
3 > 8 5 
4 
Box/round shaped 
< 2 500 
5 2 – 8 2500 
6 > 8 250 
DNV’s recommended practice, DNV-RP-107, should be the only guideline addressing the method 
to estimate the object excursion and hit probability. It provides a simple and efficient way to assess the 
risk of dropped objects in various offshore operations.  
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2.2 Damage classification in DNV’s Recommended Practice 
    Damage situation is classified into three levels: minor damage (D1), moderate damage (D2) and 
major damage (D3). In case of a damage leading to release (D3), the following classification of releases 
are used: no release (R0), small release (R1), major release (R2), as shown in Fig. 4. 
Figure 4 Damage classification to submarine pipelines 
According to DNV guided rules, minor damage will not normally have any immediate influence 
of the operation of pipelines. Moderate damage usually need repair and major damage refers to the 
damage of pipeline ruptures. Since there is a rupture here, there will be some problems about contents 
release. Therefore, three release levels are offered from no release to major release. There is nothing 
special for no release level, which means that the hydrocarbon transported does not release from the 
pipeline. For small release, the pipeline may release small amount of contents from small to medium 
holes in the pipe wall (<80mm diameter). It will not stop until the hole is detected. Major release will 
lead to a total release of the content and will continue until the pipeline is isolated. 
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2.3 Energy analysis in DNV’s Recommended Practice 
For submarine pipelines, the energies they subject can be categorized into four genres, 𝐸𝑆 – dent- 
absorbed energy for steel pipelines, 𝐸𝐸 – the kinetic energy including terminal energy 𝐸𝑇 and the 
energy of added hydrodynamic mass 𝐸𝐴, 𝐸𝐶 – concrete coating energy, 𝐸𝑃 – polymer coating energy.  
While dropped objects finally hitting on the subsea pipelines, most impact are expected to result 
in a relatively “smooth” dent shape. The dent-absorbed energy relationship for steel pipelines are given 
as followed 
                     Es = 16 (
2π
9
)
1
2
∙ mp ∙ (
D0
t
)
1
2
∙ D ∙ (
δ
D0
)
3
2
                         (9) 
where, 𝑚𝑝 = plastic moment capacity of the wall (=
1
4
𝜎𝑦𝑡
2), 
       𝛿 = pipe deformation (or dent depth), 
       𝑡 = wall thickness,  
       𝜎𝑦 = yield stress,  
       D0 = steel outer diameter. 
    The plastic moment is defined as the moment at which the entire cross section has reached its yield 
stress. This is theoretically the maximum bending moment that the section can resist - when this point 
is reached a plastic hinge is formed and any load beyond this point will result in theoretically infinite 
plastic deformation. 
The additional failure of punching through the wall, leading to leakage, can occur for higher 
velocity impacts or locally small and sharp impact geometry. The possibility of leakage and total rupture 
is included as a progressive conditional probability, where probability increases with increasing impact 
energy. The proposed damage classification used for bare steel pipes are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4 Impact capacity and damage classification of steel pipelines and risers 
Dent/ 
Diameter (%) 
Damage description 
Conditional Probability 
D1 D2 D3 R0 R1 R2 
<5 Minor damage 1 0 0 1 0 0 
5-10 
Major damage.                                    
Leakage anticipated. 
0.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0 
10-15 
Major damage.                                       
Leakage and rupture anticipated. 
0 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.2 0.05 
15-20 
Major damage.                                            
Leakage and rupture anticipated. 
0 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25 
>20 Rupture 0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.7 
For the kinetic energy 𝐸𝐸, we calculate the terminal velocity first with Equation (10) followed: 
(m − V𝜌)𝑔 =
1
2
𝜌𝐶𝑑𝐴𝑣𝑇
2                          (10) 
Then, we could get the square of terminal velocity as: 
𝑣𝑇
2 =  
2(𝑚−𝑉𝜌)𝑔
𝜌𝐶𝑑𝐴
                             (11) 
where, 𝑚 = mass of dropped object, 
       𝑉 = volume of dropped object, 
       𝜌 = density of sea water, 
       𝐴 = collision area, 
       𝐶𝑑 = drag coefficient; 
Since kinetic energy includes both terminal energy 𝐸𝑇 and the energy of added hydrodynamic 
mass 𝐸𝐴, it can be written as: 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝑇 + 𝐸𝐴 =
1
2
(𝑚 + 𝑚𝑎)𝑣𝑇
2                      (12) 
where, 𝑚𝑎 = 𝜌𝐶𝑎𝑉, 
       𝐶𝑎 = added mass coefficient; 
After substituting 𝑚𝑎 and 𝑣𝑇
2 into Equation (12), we could easily obtain Equation (13) below: 
𝐸𝐸 =
𝑔
𝐶𝑑𝐴
(
𝑚2
𝜌
− 𝑉. 𝑚 + 𝐶𝑎𝑉(𝑚 − 𝑉𝜌))                   (13) 
For concrete coating energy, different from DNV rules, 𝐸𝐶 in this paper is chosen as the mean of 
the concrete coating energy for long/flat shaped objects  𝐸𝐶1 and the concrete coating energy for 
box/round shaped objects 𝐸𝐶2. 
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                                 𝐸𝐶1 = 𝑌𝐵
4
3
√𝐷𝑥0
3                              (14)   
                                 𝐸𝐶2 = 𝑌𝐵ℎ𝑥0                                 (15) 
                                 𝐸𝑐 =
𝐸𝐶1+𝐸𝐶2
2
                                 (16) 
where, 𝑌 = crushing strength, 
      𝐵 = width of the dropped object, 
      ℎ = height of the dropped object; 
      𝑥0 = penetration depth, assume it is equal to wall thickness; 
    Fig. 5 gives a clearer view of the relationship between diameter and penetration depth. 
Figure 5 Impact in concrete coating (DNV, 2010) 
According to DNV guide rule, the crushing strength should be 3 to 5 times of cube strength. As 
the cube strength varies typical from 35 to 45 MPa, here we use the middle point 40 MPa to calculate 
the energy. Similarly, the energy absorption in polymer coating is chosen as 15 kJ according to Table 5 
since the concrete coating thickness of the dropped objects in this paper is 60mm.  
Table 5 Energy absorption in polymer coating, 𝐸𝑃 
Type of coating Energy absorption 
Corrosion coating with a thickness of maximum 3 – 6 mm. ~0 kJ 
Thicker multi-layer coating 
(typical insulation coating with 
varying thickness) 
6-15 mm ~5 kJ 
15-40 mm ~10 kJ 
>40 mm ~15 kJ 
Mechanical protection systems (e.g. Uraduct) 5 kJ – 10 kJ 
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2.4 Basic theory for Dropped Objects Simulator (DROBS) in Two Dimensions (2D) 
Dropped Objects Simulator – DROBS – is an in-house tool used to calculate the Equations of 
Motion (EOM) of cylindrical dropped objects. In his paper, it will be used to calculate the first three 
cases which will be mentioned later. For this in-house tool, two coordinate systems are used in the two-
dimensional (2D) theory as shown in Fig. 6. OXZ is a global coordinate system in which the X-axis 
represents the stationary water surface and Z-axis points vertically above. The local coordinate system, 
which is denoted by oxz, is fixed on the cylinder with aligned x-axis. The origin of this local coordinate 
system is assumed to be located at the middle of dropped objects (Yu et al 2019).  
Figure 6 Coordinate systems for equations of motion in two dimensions (Yu et al 2019) 
In this paper, the mass of dropped object is assumed to be uniformly distributed and the object 
itself is rigid and long/flat shaped in this method. Therefore, this kind of dropped objects will share the 
same mass center and geometric center.  
According to Aanesland (1987), the falling process could be simplified into a two-dimensional 
problem considering only the motions in the x-z plane. The velocity components are 𝑈1 (surge), 𝑈3 
(heave), and Ω2 (pitch). The equations of motion are shown as followed: 
                     (𝑚 − 𝜌𝛻)𝑔sin(𝛽) + 𝐹𝑑𝑥 = 𝑚?̇?1                        (17) 
 −(𝑚 − 𝜌𝛻)𝑔cos(𝛽) + 𝐹𝑑𝑧 = {𝑈1𝑚𝑡𝑈3 − 𝑈1(𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑡)Ω2 + 𝑚33?̇?3} + 𝑚(?̇?3 − 𝑈1Ω2)     (18) 
                   𝑀𝑑𝑦 + 𝑈1(𝑚33 + 𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑡)𝑈3 = 𝑈1𝑥𝑡
2𝑚𝑡Ω2 + 𝑚55Ω̇2 + 𝑀55Ω̇2         (19) 
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where, β = the instantaneous rotational angle between x-axis and X-axis, 
      m = mass of the cylinder, 
      𝑀55 = moment of inertia in pitch direction, 
      𝑚33 = added mass for heave motion from strip theory, 
      𝑚55 = added mass for pitch motion from strip theory, 
      𝑚𝑡 = 2D added mass coefficient for heave direction at the trailing edge, 
      𝑥𝑡 = longitudinal position of effective trailing edge, 
       g = acceleration of gravity, 
       ρ = the density of sea water, 
       ∇ = volume of the cylinder; 
    It should be noted that the motions in the above equations are stated in the body-fixed coordinate 
system oxz. Longitudinal position of effective trailing edge 𝑥𝑡 is introduced because the ends of the 
cylinder are flat. Slender body theory assumes a smooth change in geometry, but the abrupt termination 
of the cylinder does not satisfy this condition. As shown in curly brackets on the right side of Equation 
(18) and (19), an additional force component is also included to account for trailing edge effect of the 
elongated elongate object (Newman, 1977). The other terms on the right side indicate inertial forces 
and moments. 
In addition, viscous forces and moment, 𝐹𝑑𝑥, 𝐹𝑑𝑧, and 𝑀𝑑𝑦 are evaluated as followed:  
    𝐹𝑑𝑥   = −0.664πD√𝜈𝜌
2𝐿𝑈1√|𝑈1| −
1
8
ρπ𝐶𝑑𝑥𝐷
2𝑈1|𝑈1|             (20) 
    𝐹𝑑𝑧 = 0.5 ∫ ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥                    (21) 
    𝑀𝑑𝑦 = −0.5 ∫ ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷𝑥𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥                  (22) 
The first term in Equation (20) represents the frictional drag which can be obtained from boundary 
layer theory for turbulent flow (Schlichting, 1979) and the second term represents a form drag 
component (Hoerner, 1958). Morison equation (Gudmestad et al, 1996) is used in Equation (21) and 
(22). The unknown parameter 𝑈𝑧(𝑥) is the local relative velocity in z-axis direction between cylinder 
and water. It could be represented as: 
                𝑈𝑧(𝑥) = −(𝑈3 − Ω2𝑥),      − 0.5𝐿 < 𝑥 < 0.5𝐿.                  (23) 
After submitting Equation (23) into Equation (21) and (22), we can obtain: 
𝐹𝑑𝑧 = 0.5 ∫ ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥 
                            = 0.5ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷 ∫ −(𝑈3 − Ω2𝑥)|𝑈3 − Ω2𝑥|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥            (24) 
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  𝑀𝑑𝑦 = −0.5 ∫ ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷𝑥𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|𝑈𝑧(𝑥)|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥 
                            = 0.5ρ𝐶𝑑𝑧𝐷 ∫ 𝑥(𝑈3 − Ω2𝑥)|𝑈3 − Ω2𝑥|
0.5𝐿
−0.5𝐿
d𝑥            (25) 
where, D = diameter of the cylinder, 
      𝜈 = kinematic viscosity of water, 
      L = length of the cylinder, 
      𝐶𝑑𝑥 = drag coefficient in x-direction, 
      𝐶𝑑𝑧 = drag coefficient in z-direction; 
In the numerical simulation, after solving 𝑈1, 𝑈3 and Ω2 at each time step, the motions in the 
local coordinate system can be transformed into the motions in the global system by using this 
relationship below: 
                             [?̇?
?̇?
] = [
cos(𝛽) −sin(𝛽)
sin(𝛽) cos(𝛽)
] [
𝑈1
𝑈3
]                   (26) 
As axis Y and axis y are parallel, the inertial value[𝑋0, 𝑌0] = [0,0], and ?̇? = Ω2. Therefore, the 
rotation speed of the dropped cylinder around the axis Y and the axis y coincide (Yu et al 2019). 
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2.5 Failure probability analysis 
In order to apply the sensitivity analysis, we use limit state function here. This is a concept related 
to a specified requirement is defined as a state of the structure including its loads at which the structure 
is just on the point of not satisfying the requirement (Ditlevsen. et al. 2005). The condition may refer to 
a degree of loading or other actions on the structure, while the criteria refer to structural integrity, fitness 
for use, durability or other design requirements. Therefore, the limit state function G is introduced into 
this paper defined as  
                               𝐺 = 𝐿 − 𝑆                                  (27) 
where, L is the load that can be withstood by the property of the pipeline itself, S is the strength that 
comes from the dropped object. Fig. 7 illustrates the relationship between S and L as followed: 
Figure 7 Failure space according to Equation (27) 
The critical line for limit state is described by G = 0. When the strength is larger than pipeline load, 
failure takes place with G<0, similarly, the survival region is G>0. As a result, the probability of failure 
can be defined as Equation (28): 
                       𝑃𝑓 = 𝑃𝑟( 𝐺 ≤ 0) = 𝑃𝑟( 𝐿 ≤ 𝑆)                           (28) 
    According to Yong et al. (2014), the definition of probability of failure can be both qualitatively 
and quantitatively estimated as failure frequencies of different types of degradation mechanisms 
operating in the pipeline system. As a result, we define the probability of failure as followed: 
                         𝑃𝑂𝐹 = 𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑙,𝑟. 𝑃𝑓,𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
                             (29) 
where, 𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑙,𝑟 is frequency of hit to the subsea line within a certain ring (per year), see Equation 
(8). 𝑃𝑓,𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
 is the probability of damage. 
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2.6 Sensitivity analysis adopted in Monte Carlo Simulation  
According to limit state function in Equation (27), assume that both L and S follow Normal 
distribution, we could get: 
𝐿 ~ 𝑁(𝜇𝐿 , 𝜎𝐿
2) 
𝑆 ~ 𝑁(𝜇𝑆, 𝜎𝑆
2) 
Because of the nature of the normal distribution, we could easily obtain: 
                        𝐺 ~ 𝑁(𝜇𝐿 − 𝜇𝑆, 𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2)                           (30) 
Let 𝜇𝐺 =  𝜇𝐿 − 𝜇𝑆, 𝜎𝐺 =  √𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2, we could normalize the function as followed: 
                         ∫ N(G; 𝜇𝐺 , 𝜎𝐺
2)
0
−∞
dG = 1                          (31) 
after which, we could get: 
                             
𝐺−𝜇𝐺
𝜎𝐺
~𝑁(0,1), 𝐺 ≤ 0                           (32) 
As mentioned in section 2.3, 𝐸𝐸 , 𝐸𝑆, 𝐸𝐶 and 𝐸𝑃 are four energies used to present the mean of 
the reliability, respectively. Let 𝜎𝐸𝐸, 𝜎𝐸𝑆, 𝜎𝐸𝐶 and 𝜎𝐸𝑃 to be the standard deviation of 𝐸𝐸 , 𝐸𝑆, 𝐸𝐶 
and 𝐸𝑃, respectively. Since 𝐸𝑆, 𝐸𝐶 and 𝐸𝑃 are assumed to follow the normal distribution and each 
of the random variables corresponds to a certain value of 𝐸𝐸 , a concept is recommended here as 
coefficient of variance (CV) to calculate 𝜎𝐸𝐸, 𝜎𝐸𝑆, 𝜎𝐸𝐶 and 𝜎𝐸𝑃 with equation followed: 
                              CV =
𝜎
𝜇
                                 (33) 
In probability theory and statistics, the coefficient of variation (CV) is a standardized measure 
of dispersion of a probability distribution or frequency distribution, which is often expressed as a 
percentage. The values of CV related to each energy is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6 Values of coefficient of variance related to relevant energy 
 𝐸𝑆 𝐸𝐶 𝐸𝑃 𝐸𝐸 
coefficient of variance 5% 20% 20% 10% 
Then 𝜎𝐿
2 is calculated as: 
                          𝜎𝐿
2 = 𝜎𝐸𝑆
2 + 𝜎𝐸𝐶
2 + 𝜎𝐸𝐺
2                           (34) 
𝜎𝑆
2 is calculated as: 
                                𝜎𝑆
2 = 𝜎𝐸𝐸
2                                 (35) 
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The main impact from dropped object comes from kinetic energy. As most limit state situations 
are implicit, we use the thought of response surface method to transform the implicit function to explicit 
one, as mentioned by M. Jorge. Thus, neglecting the deformation of dropped objects, meanwhile, 
considering the impact energies absorbed completely by submarine pipelines, the limit state function 
can be rewritten as:  
              𝐺 = (𝐸𝐶 + 𝐸𝑃 + 𝐸𝑠) − 𝐸𝐸  
             = (𝐸𝐶 + 𝐸𝑃 + 𝐸𝑠) −
𝑔
𝐶𝑑𝐴
(
𝑚2
𝜌
− 𝑉. 𝑚 + 𝐶𝑎𝑉(𝑚 − 𝑉𝜌))                  (36) 
As can be seen from the Equation (36), there are totally five random parameters, which is mass, 
volume, added mass coefficient, drag coefficient and collision area. In this paper, we will discuss the 
reliability sensitivity for all these five random variables. To fit the probability analysis, the following 
assumptions are used: 
1. Mass follows uniform distribution between 1 to 10 tones as cranes have a limited capacity. 
2. Volume follows normal distribution with mean 0.081𝑚3 and standard deviation at 0.023𝑚3. 
3. The collision area between pipelines and dropped objects are determined by several reasons, 
which means the exact value of that cannot be predicted. Meanwhile, Yu et al. (2016) have 
proposed mass related upper and lower bounds for the minimum impact area (from 0.5 to 3), 
therefore truncated normal distribution is used to modeling collision area as a random variable. 
4. Similarly, added mass coefficient and drag coefficient also follow truncated normal 
distribution, as according to DNV guide, 𝐶𝑎 and 𝐶𝑑 value between 0.1 to 1.5 and 0.7 to 1.5, 
respectively. 
    Table 7 shows the summary of the distribution types of random variables.  
Table 7 Distribution types of random variables 
Parameter Distribution Type 
Mass (𝑚) Uniform 
Volume (𝑉) Normal 
Collision Area (𝐴) Truncated Normal 
Drag coefficient (𝐶𝑑) Truncated Normal 
Add mass coefficient (𝐶𝑎) Truncated Normal 
    According to Papaioannou et al. (2010), for sensitivity analysis, we denote ?̃?𝑓(θ; σ) as an 
approximation of the probability of damage, expressed as Equation (37). 
                       ?̃?𝑓(𝜃, 𝜎𝐺) =  ∫ 𝜙 (−
𝐺(𝒙;𝜃)
𝜎𝐺
)
𝐷(𝒙)
𝑓𝑿(𝒙)𝑑𝑥                       (37) 
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where, 𝑋 = an n-dimensional vector of random variables described by the joint PDF 𝑓𝑋(𝑥), 
      𝑓𝑋(𝑥) = joint probability density function of random variables, 
      𝐷(𝑥) = 𝑅𝑛, the set of all n-tuples of real numbers, 
       𝜙 = standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
       θ = the parameter to which sensitivity analysis is performed,  
       𝐺 = limit state function; 
    The reason for integration on normal cumulative distribution is that this is a distribution based on 
the mean value. Taking the derivative of Equation (37) with respect to θ, and according to Leibniz 
integral rule we could rewritten Equation (37) as: 
              
𝜕?̃?𝑓(𝜃;𝜎𝐺)
𝜕𝜃
=  − ∫
1
𝜎𝐺
𝜑 (
𝐺(𝒙;𝜃)
𝜎𝐺
)
𝐷(𝒙)
𝜕𝐺(𝒙;𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
𝑓𝑿(𝒙)𝑑𝑥                    (38) 
    It should be noticed that since standard normal distribution is symmetric at the origin, the negative 
sign in 𝜙 function could be removed for symmetry of 𝜙. 
    Finally, we use Monte Carlo samples {𝒙𝒌, 𝑘 = 1, … … , 𝑛𝑠} to simplify and estimate the domain 
integral in Equation (38), we can get: 
              
𝜕?̃?𝑓(𝜃;𝜎𝐺)
𝜕𝜃
≈  
1
𝑛𝑠
∑ [−
1
𝜎𝐺
𝜑 (
𝐺(𝒙𝒌;𝜃)
𝜎𝐺
)
𝜕𝐺(𝒙𝒌;𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
]
𝑛𝑠
𝑘=1                     (39) 
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III. Case Study 
3.1 Property of dropped objects and subsea pipelines 
In this paper, the “detailed risk assessment of dropped objects on a 20-inch pipeline at seabed”, as 
described in DNV recommended practice rule, is selected as the study case. Three different groups of 
flat/long shaped dropped objects (Case 1 ~ 3) and three different groups of box/round shaped dropped 
objects (Case 4 ~ 6) are used in the model with weights less than 2 tones (Case 1, Case 4), between 2 
tones and 8 tones (Case 2, Case 5) and greater than 8 tones (Case 3, Case 6). The basic properties of the 
dropped objects and subsea pipelines are shown in the Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.  
Table 8 Properties of dropped objects 
Properties Unit  
Length for long shape object (l) m 12 
Length for box shape object (l) m 5 
Height for impacting object (h) m 0.3 
Breadth for impacting object (b) m 0.03 
Gravity acceleration (g) m/s^2 9.81 
Table 9 Properties of subsea pipelines 
Properties Unit  
Pipeline diameter (D) m 0.63 
Wall thickness (t) m 0.018 
Concrete thickness (c) m 0.06 
Yield stress (s) N/m^2 4.5e06 
In addition, the frequency of dropped load into the sea is chosen as 1.2 × 10−5 per lift.  
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3.2 Field layout 
The field layout is shown in Fig. 8. It can be seen that there are some areas of the subsea pipes 
shielded by the platform legs and bracing, within the range from 0m to 60m. That’s why the pipeline 
length considered in the calculation of probability 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑟 should be zero in Table 10. Here, we just 
discuss the subsea layout from 0m to 100m, with water depth at 100m. 
Figure 8 Field layout with 10-meter interval rings (DNV, 2010) 
Table 10 Length of pipeline within each of 10-meter interval rings on the seabed  
 
Pipeline length within each ring 
0m 
– 
10m 
10m 
– 
20m 
20m 
– 
30m 
30m 
– 
40m 
40m 
– 
50m 
50m 
– 
60m 
60m 
– 
70m 
70m 
– 
80m 
80m 
– 
90m 
90m 
– 
100m 
Length (m) 0 0 0 0 0
* 0
* 11 51 41 21 
* Assumed shielded by the platform legs and bracing 
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IV. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Hit Probability based on DNV rules 
    The pipeline diameter is 0.63m including coating and the object size is assumed to be 12-meter 
long for long/flat shaped objects and 5-meter long for box/round shaped objects. DNV rules had been 
used to calculate the hit probability within each ring. The results are shown in Table 11 as followed.  
Table 11 Hit probability within each ring 
Object Hit probability within each ring [m-2] 
no Des. Breadth (m) 0m – 10m 10m –20m 20m – 30m 30m – 40m 40m –50m 
1 
Flat/long 
shaped 
12 9.26E-04 2.69E-04 1.23E-04 5.79E-05 2.60E-05 
2 12 1.50E-03 3.41E-04 9.45E-05 2.12E-05 3.52E-06 
3 12 2.38E-03 2.45E-04 1.38E-05 2.73E-07 1.70E-09 
4 
Box/round 
shaped 
5 1.37E-03 3.33E-04 1.07E-04 2.98E-05 6.62E-06 
5 5 2.38E-03 2.45E-04 1.38E-05 2.73E-07 1.70E-09 
6 5 3.00E-03 5.97E-05 8.63E-08 4.72E-12 8.13E-18 
Object Hit probability within each ring [m-2] 
no Des. Breadth (m) 50m – 60m 60m –70m 70m – 80m 80m –90m 90m – 100m 
1 
Flat/long 
shaped 
12 1.07E-05 3.95E-06 1.31E-06 3.83E-07 9.93E-08 
2 12 4.18E-07 3.47E-08 2.00E-09 7.98E-11 2.18E-12 
3 12 3.17E-12 1.71E-15 1.88E-19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
4 
Box/round 
shaped 
5 1.13E-06 1.46E-07 1.40E-08 1.01E-09 5.33E-11 
5 5 3.17E-12 1.71E-15 1.88E-19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
6 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
    To intuitively display the differences between these data, Fig. 9 plots a 3-D histogram to show the 
results of hit probability of dropped object within each ring. 
Figure 9 Hit probability with each ring 
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A similar trend could be seen from the Fig. 9 that, within the excursion around 0m to 30m, it is 
more likely for dropped objects to hit within each ring area. If we categorize these six cases into two 
groups – Case 1, 2, 3 and Case 4, 5, 6 – it will be apparent that hit probability increases as the mass of 
the dropped object increases. This is reasonable that generally, heavier objects are less affected by the 
outside environment than lighter ones in the same circumstance, since lighter objects are more likely to 
follow a “leaf” moment (Katteland et.al, 1995) when falling regardless of weights. 
When water depth gets deeper, the probability gets smaller. This may be because that when the 
water is deep enough, the dropped object will obtain and maintain a terminal velocity before it hits 
within the ring area. This procedure will be more likely influenced by several outside environment 
conditions, like currents, waves etc. 
Similarly, the conditional probability for dropped objects to hit the pipeline is calculated with same 
method. For each object to hit the pipeline within 10-meter intervals on the seabed, its conditional 
probability depends mainly on the results from the Table 10, the length of pipeline within each ring in 
Table 10, the pipeline diameter and object size in Table 8 as well as Table 9 and Equation (7). The results 
are shown in Table 12.  
Table 12 Conditional probability for objects to hit the pipeline 
Object Conditional probability within each ring 
no Des. Breadth (m) 0m – 10m 10m –20m 20m – 30m 30m – 40m 40m –50m 
1 
Flat/long 
shaped 
12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
2 12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
3 12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
4 
Box/round 
shaped 
5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
5 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
6 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Object Conditional probability within each ring 
no Des. Breadth (m) 50m – 60m 60m –70m 70m – 80m 80m –90m 90m – 100m 
1 
Flat/long 
shaped 
12 0.00E+00 5.49E-04 8.42E-04 1.98E-04 2.63E-05 
2 12 0.00E+00 4.82E-06 1.29E-06 4.13E-08 5.78E-10 
3 12 0.00E+00 2.37E-13 1.21E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
4 
Box/round 
shaped 
5 0.00E+00 9.02E-06 4.03E-06 2.32E-07 6.30E-09 
5 5 0.00E+00 1.06E-13 5.41E-17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
6 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, since areas from 0m to 60m of the subsea pipes are shielded by the 
platform legs and bracing, the conditional probability should be zero in those areas. A 3-D figure is also 
plotted to intuitive the data. 
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Figure 10 Conditional probability to hit the pipeline 
Obviously, only Case 1 has the largest probability to hit on the subsea pipeline within excursion 
around 60m to 90m. Although box/round shaped objects have larger number lifted per year than 
long/flat shaped objects, the landing points for heavier objects are more likely to scatter close to the 
offshore platform. While for lighter objects, they will be affected by many other factors like currents 
etc. which will lead them to a further distance. 
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4.2 Hit probability based on DNV rules and DROBS 
This in-house method can only be used to calculate the long/flat shaped dropped objects. As a 
result, we use properties of long/flat shaped objects from Case 1 to 3 as study cases. 1000 samples are 
used to calculate the hit probability and the conditional hit probability. We count the number of samples 
falling in certain ring area, and divided it by the total sample number to obtain the original hit probability. 
These results will be compared to those calculated by DNV rules method. The comparison of hit 
probability within each ring is shown in Table 13.  
Table 13 Comparison of hit probability within each ring 
Case Index Method 
Probability within each ring [m-2] 
0m – 10m 10m –20m 20m – 30m 30m – 40m 40m –50m 
Case 1 
DNV 9.26E-04 2.69E-04 1.23E-04 5.79E-05 2.60E-05 
DROBS 2.48E-03 2.23E-04 7.64E-06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 1.50E-03 3.41E-04 9.45E-05 2.12E-05 3.52E-06 
DROBS 2.97E-03 7.11E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 2.38E-03 2.45E-04 1.38E-05 2.73E-07 1.70E-09 
DROBS 3.18E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case Index Method 
Probability within each ring [m-2] (Continued) 
50m – 60m 60m –70m 70m – 80m 80m –90m 90m – 100m 
Case 1 
DNV 1.07E-05 3.95E-06 1.31E-06 3.83E-07 9.93E-08 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 4.18E-07 3.47E-08 2.00E-09 7.98E-11 2.18E-12 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 3.17E-12 1.71E-15 1.88E-19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
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To intuitively display the differences between these data, Fig. 11 plots a 3-D histogram to show 
the difference between hit probabilities of dropped object within each ring. 
Figure 11 Results of hit probability within each ring from DNV (left) and DROBS (right) 
Obvious difference could be seen from Fig. 11that Case 1 calculated by DROBS has a larger hit 
probability within each ring, approximately twice the result from DNV rules. The similarity is that, both 
of these two methods show the same number magnitude with a relatively dangerous excursion around 
0m to 10 m, and the probability has same trend increasing with gradually increasing mass. 
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When it comes to conditional hit probability of dropped objects hitting on the subsea pipelines, the 
results are shown in Table 14 as followed:  
Table 14 Conditional hit probability of dropped objects hitting on pipelines 
Case 
Index 
Method 
Conditional probability of hitting the pipeline 
0m – 10m 10m –20m 20m – 30m 30m – 40m 40m –50m 
Case 1 
DNV 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 
Index 
Method 
Conditional probability of hitting the pipeline (Continued) 
50m – 60m 60m –70m 70m – 80m 80m –90m 90m – 100m 
Case 1 
DNV 0.00E+00 5.49E-04 8.42E-04 1.98E-04 2.63E-05 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 0.00E+00 4.82E-06 1.29E-06 4.13E-08 5.78E-10 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 0.00E+00 2.37E-13 1.21E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
A 3-D plot is also plotted to intuitively distinguish the difference as shown in Fig. 12. 
Figure 12 Results of conditional probability hitting on pipelines from DNV (left) and DROBS (right) 
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Since excursion from 0m to 60m is assumed to be shielded by offshore platform, the conditional 
probability of hitting on the subsea pipelines should be zero. However, based on DROBS’ results of hit 
probability within each ring, excursion from 60m to 100m also shows no probability for all three cases. 
4.3 Hit probability based on DNV rules and DROBS without platform shielded 
We assume that the subsea pipelines are not shielded by the offshore platform to see the difference 
between the results from these two method. Then, the layout of pipelines will be changed into Table 15 
as followed: 
Table 15 Length of pipeline within each of 10-meter interval rings on the seabed without shielded 
 
Pipeline length within each ring without shielded 
0m 
– 
10m 
10m 
– 
20m 
20m 
– 
30m 
30m 
– 
40m 
40m 
– 
50m 
50m 
– 
60m 
60m 
– 
70m 
70m 
– 
80m 
80m 
– 
90m 
90m 
– 
100m 
Length (m) 10 10 10 10 10 12 11 51 41 21 
    Therefore, we could get another group of conditional probability of hitting the pipeline shown in 
Table 16. 
Table 16 Conditional probability of hitting the pipeline (without shielded) 
Case 
Index 
Method 
Conditional probability of hitting the pipeline without shielded 
0m – 10m 10m –20m 20m – 30m 30m – 40m 40m –50m 
Case 1 
DNV 1.17E-01 3.40E-02 1.55E-02 7.32E-03 3.28E-03 
DROBS 3.13E-01 2.81E-02 9.65E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 1.90E-01 4.30E-02 1.19E-02 2.68E-03 4.45E-04 
DROBS 3.75E-01 8.98E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 3.00E-01 3.09E-02 1.74E-03 3.45E-05 2.15E-07 
DROBS 4.02E-01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 
Index 
Method 
Conditional probability of hitting the pipeline without shielded (Continued) 
50m – 60m 60m –70m 70m – 80m 80m –90m 90m – 100m 
Case 1 
DNV 1.62E-03 5.49E-04 8.42E-04 1.98E-04 2.63E-05 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 2 
DNV 6.33E-05 4.82E-06 1.29E-06 4.13E-08 5.78E-10 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Case 3 
DNV 4.81E-10 2.37E-13 1.21E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DROBS 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
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3-D figure is shown as followed: 
Figure 13 Conditional probability of hitting on subsea pipelines unshielded 
    It can be seen the shape of histogram are almost the same as that in Fig. 11. However, it should be 
noted that the magnitude of results are much larger. This is reasonable because if there is no shield over 
subsea pipeline from 0m to 60m, heavier dropped objects will have larger probability to cause damage. 
There is still some difference between the results of two methods, especially for Case 1. The reason 
may be because that the estimation of lateral deviation 𝛿 based on Equation (2) is a purely empirical 
estimation, which completely neglects the effects of hydrodynamic coefficients (Awotahegn, 2015). 
Since DROBS takes the complex hydrodynamic coefficients into account, it may be more reliable 
especially on lighter objects.  
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4.4 Probability of damage 
The probability of damage in Table 17 is calculated on the behalf of dropped objects with weight 
less than 10 tones.  
Table 17 Probability of failure and damage 
Different 
levels of 
damage 
Impact energy Damage 
probability 
Conditional probability of failure, POF 
(normalized) 
Steel pipe Total D1 D2 D3 
Level 1 <15 <65 0.4661 6.37E-06 0 0 
Level 2 15 - 40 65 - 90 0.0770 1.05E-07 8.41E-07 1.05E-07 
Level 3 40 - 75 90 - 125 0.0825 0 8.46E-07 2.82E-07 
Level 4 75 - 115 125 - 165 0.0439 0 1.50E-07 4.50E-07 
Level 5 > 115 > 165 0.3304 0 4.51E-07 4.06E-06 
Damage levels here are related with the ratio of dent over diameter of pipelines in Table 4, which 
can be reorganized into Table 18 as followed: 
Table 18 Different damage level corresponding to different ratio 
Different levels of damage Dent /Diameter  / D (%) 
Level 1 < 5 
Level 2 5 - 10 
Level 3 10 - 15 
Level 4 15 - 20 
Level 5 > 20 
    D1, D2, D3 is damage classification mentioned in section 2.2 as minor damage, moderate damage 
and major damage. The figure of conditional probability of failure versus damage level is shown as 
followed: 
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Figure 14 Conditional probability of failure versus damage level 
It can be seen that minor damage almost occurs at damage Level 1 with little dent mark. Since 
major damage will cause large influence on subsea pipeline, it is reasonable for it to happen mostly on 
damage Level 5 with more than 20% dent eruption. 
From the table we could see that damage Level 1 has the highest probability at 46.61% followed 
by Level 5 at 33.04%. This result makes sense that although about 38% third party damage occurs every 
year, those who cause large casualty and losses are not much. As a result, damage Level 1 - damage 
neither requiring repair, nor resulting in any release of hydrocarbons - occurs frequently. 
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4.5 Results for reliability sensitivity analysis 
The results of reliability sensitivity analysis with Monte Carlo Simulation for the probability of 
failure related to four random variables are calculated in MATLAB. To preliminarily obtain the 
normalized results, we randomly select 10000 different data of mass, volume, collision area, added mass 
coefficient and drag coefficient, respectively. The trend of change in variables’ sensitivity has been 
shown from Fig. 15 to Fig. 19. The horizontal axis shows the parameter to which sensitivity analysis is 
performed and the vertical axis shows the extent to which the relevant parameter affects the probability 
of failure, which is 
𝜕?̃?𝑓(𝜃;𝜎𝐺)
𝜕𝜃
 in Equation (39). In Fig. 15, it is written as 𝑑Pf 𝑑m⁄ ; in Fig. 16, the 
vertical axis represents 𝑑Pf 𝑑Ca⁄  ; in Fig. 17, the vertical axis represents 𝑑Pf 𝑑A⁄  ; in Fig. 18, the 
vertical axis represents 𝑑Pf 𝑑C𝑑⁄  ; in Fig. 19, the vertical axis represents 𝑑Pf 𝑑V⁄  . Meanwhile, the 
relevant data results will be shown in Table 19 to Table 23. 
After analyzing the figures obtained below, we can categorize these five random variables into two 
groups, one for mass and added mass coefficient, and the other for collision area, drag coefficient and 
volume. Some conclusions can be made that for variable mass, it perfectly follows normal distribution. 
This makes sense that light dropped objects are more likely to cause minor damage related to Level 1. 
When mass increases, Level 5 will be more sensitive than the other Levels, as heavier objects will cause 
larger damages. Added mass coefficient, on the other hand, may have little influence on the whole 
system, since the sensitivity of it shows a nearly flat line pattern. According to Equation (36), as drag 
coefficient and collision area are both on the denominator, they are considered to have similar trend 
pattern.  
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Figure 15 Sensitivity with mass 
Figure 16 Sensitivity with added mass coefficient 
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Figure 17 Sensitivity with collision area 
Figure 18 Sensitivity with drag coefficient 
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Figure 19 Sensitivity with volume 
    Detailed data for these figures are shown in tables followed:  
Table 19 Data for sensitivity analysis on mass  
M 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 
Level 1 2.7454E-76 5.6940E-05 2.1838E-04 3.2455E-05 1.1812E-05 6.5221E-06 
Level 2 5.9566E-160 8.1394E-06 3.4875E-04 4.9393E-05 1.5641E-05 7.9123E-06 
Level 3 0.0000E+00 1.1101E-06 4.8410E-04 8.2254E-05 2.2561E-05 1.0248E-05 
Level 4 0.0000E+00 7.6930E-11 4.6136E-04 1.3662E-04 3.3930E-05 1.3819E-05 
Level 5 0.0000E+00 1.5896E-22 2.6757E-04 2.1132E-04 5.1602E-05 1.9085E-05 
Table 20 Data for sensitivity analysis on added mass coefficient  
Ca 0.1 0.28 0.46 0.64 0.82 1 
Level 1 2.4597E-05 2.4597E-05 2.4596E-05 2.4596E-05 2.4595E-05 2.4595E-05 
Level 2 2.5685E-05 2.5685E-05 2.5684E-05 2.5683E-05 2.5683E-05 2.5682E-05 
Level 3 2.7359E-05 2.7359E-05 2.7358E-05 2.7358E-05 2.7357E-05 2.7356E-05 
Level 4 2.8436E-05 2.8435E-05 2.8435E-05 2.8434E-05 2.8433E-05 2.8433E-05 
Level 5 3.1576E-05 3.1575E-05 3.1575E-05 3.1574E-05 3.1573E-05 3.1572E-05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 21 Data for sensitivity analysis on collision area 
A 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Level 1 -0.2618 -0.1488 -0.1113 -0.0927 -0.0814 -0.0737 
Level 2 -0.2718 -0.1598 -0.1228 -0.1042 -0.0926 -0.0842 
Level 3 -0.2888 -0.1767 -0.1395 -0.1201 -0.1071 -0.0967 
Level 4 -0.3055 -0.1930 -0.1544 -0.1324 -0.1157 -0.1007 
Level 5 -0.3303 -0.2169 -0.1750 -0.1472 -0.1225 -0.0985 
Table 22 Data for sensitivity analysis on drag coefficient  
Cd 0.7 0.86 1.02 1.18 1.34 1.5 
Level 1 -0.1936 -0.1640 -0.1430 -0.1277 -0.1161 -0.1070 
Level 2 -0.2101 -0.1797 -0.1582 -0.1426 -0.1307 -0.1214 
Level 3 -0.2186 -0.1890 -0.1680 -0.1528 -0.1412 -0.1320 
Level 4 -0.2319 -0.2025 -0.1815 -0.1661 -0.1543 -0.1448 
Level 5 -0.2531 -0.2236 -0.2024 -0.1867 -0.1743 -0.1640 
Table 23 Data for sensitivity analysis on volume 
V 0.11 0.76 1.42 2.07 2.73 3.39 
Level 1 -0.0166 -0.0241 -0.0327 -0.0421 -0.0529 -0.0645 
Level 2 -0.0175 -0.0253 -0.0341 -0.0437 -0.0544 -0.0655 
Level 3 -0.0184 -0.0263 -0.0351 -0.0447 -0.0551 -0.0658 
Level 4 -0.0197 -0.0277 -0.0364 -0.0458 -0.0558 -0.0658 
Level 5 -0.0212 -0.0293 -0.0382 -0.0475 -0.0570 -0.0661 
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V. Conclusions 
In this project, a sample field layout introduced in DNV recommended practice rule is selected as 
the study case. To better prevent the subsea systems from the damages caused by dropped objects, the 
conditional probability of failure and damage for dropped objects hitting on the pipelines is calculated. 
For the probabilities of long/flat shaped objects, both methods of DNV rules and DROBS are used. 
With Monte Carlo Simulation in MATLAB, the sensitivity analysis is used to study the influence of five 
random variables, which are mass, collision area, volume, added mass coefficient and drag coefficient.  
For the case discussed in the Appendix of DNV (2010), the sum of the conditional probability of 
failure is 7.188e-06, which is within the acceptance criteria of 1E-05. This result indicates that for either 
long/flat shaped dropped objects or box/round shaped objects, the structures and coatings of the 
pipelines may absorb some energy to protect the system from damage.  
For the probability of damage, Level 1 has the maximum likelihood to damage the submarine 
pipelines at 46.61%, followed by Level 5 of the probability of damage at 33.04%. It is reasonable that, 
in general, most of the things falling from cranes and offshore platforms weigh less than 2 tons, which 
explains the reason for the occurrence of probability of damage on Level 1. For damage Level 5, it can 
be explained that once large dropped objects (weight around 9 tones, for instance) hit on the pipeline, 
they will have larger chances to cause rupture.  
For the reliability sensitivity analysis, Fig. 15 clearly shows that the lighter objects are more likely 
to cause minor damage, and the heavier objects may cause larger damages. This is why the curves for 
Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4 and Level 5 are sequentially arranged from left to right as the mass. 
Overall, the probability of damage is very sensitive to the mass. However, it may not be so sensitive to 
the change of the added mass coefficient 𝐶𝑎, because the sensitivity curves with 𝐶𝑎 are almost nearly 
flat lines, as indicated in Fig. 16. Finally, considering that both the drag coefficient 𝐶𝑑 and collision 
area 𝐴 are given in the denominator in Equation (36), they both should have very similar pattern, as 
indicated by Figure 17 and Figure 18. 
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